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I. Introduction
The freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment encompasses more than mere
spoken words; it also protects conduct that has an expressive quality, such as flag burning.' In
the important case of United States v. O'Brien,2 the United States Supreme Court appeared to
narrow these sorts of protections in cases where there is a sufficient government interest in
prosecuting actions, such as burning draft cards, and when such acts are noncommunicative.
3
After the Supreme Court's recent holding in Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and
Institutional Rights, Inc.,4 the O'Brien holding's limitation on First Amendment protection for
expressive conduct appears to be alive and well. In Rumsfeld, the Court held that an amendment
conditioning the receipt of federal funds by law schools upon their acquiescence to military
recruiters' presence on campus did not stifle the schools' First Amendment freedoms of speech
and association- despite the schools' objections to the military's "don't ask, don't tell" policy
under which it can discharge soldiers for being openly homosexual, and despite claims that
allowing military recruiters equal access as other recruiters interfered with the schools' ability to
express their objection to the arguably discriminatory practices of the military.5
Part II of this note examines the historical background of Rumsfeld v. Forum for
Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc. Part III analyzes the unanimous opinion. Part IV
examines the case's potential impact on First Amendment jurisprudence.
1 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
2 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
3 See id. at 377-82.
4547 U.S. 47 (2006).
5 See id at 52, 70.
II. Historical Background of Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights,
Inc.
A. The First Amendment
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "Congress shall
make no law.., abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
6
B. United States v. O'Brien
In 1966, at the dawn of the Vietnam War, four men, including the defendant, burned their
registration certificates for the Selective Service on the steps of a courthouse.7 Afterwards, the
defendant told agents with the Federal Bureau of Investigations that he had committed the
unlawful act because of his personal beliefs.8 He also said later that the act was an effort to
persuade other people to adopt his position against the Vietnam War.
9
The district court, with which the United States Supreme Court agreed, rejected
O'Brien's arguments that the law he was charged with violating - prohibiting the destruction of
draft cards - unconstitutionally infringed upon his First Amendment rights and failed to serve a
legitimate purpose. 10 Although it recognized that certain actions are protected by the First
Amendment when there is a communicative element to those actions, the Supreme Court
nevertheless upheld the statute making draft card burning unlawful because it did not prohibit an
expressive act; rather, it prohibited a noncommunicative act." The court stated, "[w]e cannot
accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech' whenever
6 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
7 O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 369.
8id.
9 Id. at 370.
10 Id.
1 1 1d. at 381-82.
the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea." 12 Finally, such
limitations on First Amendment protections are permissible when there is a sufficient
government interest at stake13-in the defendant's case, the "[g]overnment's substantial interest
in assuring the continuing availability of issued Selective Service certificates."
14
III. The Rumsfeld opinion
A. Facts and Procedural History
Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc. (FAIR), an association of law schools
and faculties, filed suit against Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld and others, challenging
the constitutionality of a law passed by Congress called the Solomon Amendment,15 which
requires institutions of higher education to give military recruiters the same access to their
campuses as they do to other types of recruiters, or else be denied certain federal funds from the
Department of Defense. 16 Congress passed the law after law schools shut out military recruiters
because of the schools' objections to the federal government's "don't ask, don't tell" policy
allowing the military to discharge troops for being openly homosexual. 17 The schools
comprising FAIR have nondiscrimination policies that prohibit them from discriminating against
people based on sexual orientation and other factors.
18
For a while, some law schools found a way to comply with the Solomon Amendment
while still voicing their objection to the military's policy on homosexuals: they allowed military
recruiters access only to the undergraduate campuses, while other recruiters, such as the hiring
121d. at 376.
13 Id. at 376-77.
14 1d. at 382.
15 10 U.S.C. § 983(d) (Supp. 2005).
16 Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 51.
17 id.
18id
partners of law firms, were allowed access to the law school campuses. 19 This continued until
shortly after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, when the United States government began
requiring that schools give military recruiters equal access to the law school campuses.
20
FAIR alleged that the law schools' First Amendment rights of free speech and free
association were violated by the action the Solomon Amendment forced them to undertake with
regard to military recruiters.2 1 By forcing schools to choose between receiving federal funds and
exercising their First Amendment right not to associate themselves with the military's policy
towards homosexuals, FAIR argued, the Solomon Amendment violated the Constitution.
22
The district court denied FAIR's efforts to obtain a preliminary injunction against
enforcement of the Solomon Amendment and held that recruiting is conduct, not speech, and
thus could be regulated under O'Brien.2 3 In response to the district court's decision, Congress
codified the government's informal policy, creating the new version of the Solomon
Amendment; it now holds that institutions of higher education must give military recruiters
access to students and campuses that is at least equal to the access given to other employers.
24
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, that court agreed
with FAIR's argument that the more recent version of the Solomon Amendment was
unconstitutional for the same reasons as the old version.25 The third circuit held that the
Solomon Amendment regulated speech, not conduct, and thus disagreed with the district court
that the activity in question could be regulated under O 'Brien.26 The court also held that the law,
19 Id. at 53 (citing Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. v. Rumsfeld (FAIR 1), 291 F. Supp. 2d 269, 282
(D. N.J. 2003)).20 Id. (citing FAIR I, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 283).
21 Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 53.
22 i.
23 I. (citing FAIR I, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 311-14).
24 Id. at 54 (citing 10 U.S.C. § 983(b) (Supp. 2005)).
25 Id. (citing Forum for Academic and Inst. Rights, Inc. v. Rumsfeld (FAIR I), 390 F.3d 219 (2004)).
26 Id. at 55 (citing FAIR II, 390 F.3d. at 243-44).
by forcing schools to choose between receiving federal funds and giving up their rights to free
speech and association, violated the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. 2 7 Even if the activities
in question were treated as expressive conduct, the Solomon Amendment would still not pass
constitutional muster under the test set forth in O 'Brien.28 The case was remanded to the district
court to issue a preliminary injunction against the statute's enforcement. 29
B. The Supreme Court Opinion
1. Interpretation of the Solomon Amendment
Justice Roberts, writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, began by disposing of an
interpretation of the Solomon Amendment by law professors who submitted amicus briefs.3 °
The professors had argued that both parties in the case interpreted the law wrongly - that schools
must provide the level of access to military recruiters that it provided to nonmilitary recruiters
receiving the most favorable access. 31 Roberts nevertheless sided with the interpretation put
forth by the parties to the case.
32
2. The Funding Condition Placed on Law Schools by the Solomon
Amendment Was Constitutional
Justice Roberts next examined the condition placed on law schools by the Solomon
Amendment and found it to be constitutional.33 Roberts noted that although Congress used its
Spending Clause power to ensure equal access for military recruiters, as opposed to directly
through its powers under Article I, the funding condition still deserved deferential treatment
because it was passed by Congress acting under its authority to raise and support armies, a time
27 1d. at 54 (citing FAIR II, 390 F.3d at 229-43).
28 Id. at 55 (citing FAIR II, 390 F.3d at 244-46).
29 Id. (citing FAIR II, 390 F.3d at 246).
30 Id. at 55-56.
31 Id. The professors argued that the Solomon Amendment required schools to provide the same access to campuses
that it gives all other recruiters.32 Id. at 56.
13 Id. at 58-60.
when "judicial deference ... is at its apogee." 34 Additionally, notwithstanding the constitutional
limits on conditional spending by Congress,35 the Court held that an unconstitutional conditions
doctrine analysis was unnecessary because funding conditions are not considered
unconstitutional if they can be imposed directly without violating the Constitution.36 Roberts
wrote that the statute's funding condition was constitutional "[b]ecause the First Amendment
would not prevent Congress from directly imposing the Solomon Amendment's access
requirement.
'
"
37
3. The Solomon Amendment Did Not Muzzle Free Speech
The opinion concluded that the Solomon Amendment did not infringe upon the law
schools' First Amendment rights, because they could express their opposition to the military's
discriminatory policies while still complying with the statute. 38 Justice Roberts observed that the
law regulates conduct, not speech: "[i]t affects what law schools must do - afford equal access to
military recruiters - not what they may or may not say."39 The assumption underlying this
conclusion is that law schools' association with, or accommodation of, the military's message,
does not make the kind of expressive statement that would place it within the purview of the
First Amendment. Justice Roberts addressed the issue of expressive conduct (and eliminated that
possibility) in more detail later in the opinion. 40
Justice Roberts then rejected the two ways the Third Circuit concluded that the Solomon
Amendment violated free speech: first, that the act of allowing military recruiters on campus
requires certain actions, such as sending e-mails or posting flyers, that entail speech; and second,
34 Id. at 58 (quoting Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70 (1981)).
35 See United States v. Am. Library Assn., 539 U.S. 194, 210 (2003).
36 Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 59-60 (citing Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)).
37 1d at 60.
38id
3 9 
id.
40 1d. at 65-68.
that the statute forces law schools to accommodate the military's message. 41 Roberts recognized
that the law prohibits the government from compelling speech, but rejected the plaintiffs'
contention that such was the case with the Solomon Amendment.4 2 The opinion distinguished
two cases: West Virginia Bd. ofEd. v. Barnette, 43 holding a state law requiring children in school
to pledge allegiance to the United States flag unconstitutional, 44 and Wooley v. Maynard,45
declaring a New Hampshire law requiring state citizens to display the state motto on their license
plates unconstitutional. 46 "Compelling a law school that sends scheduling e-mails for other
recruiters to send one for a military recruiter is simply not the same" as the compelled speech in
those two cases, Justice Roberts declared, "and it trivializes the freedom protected in Barnette
and Wooley to suggest that it is.
47
As for the Third Circuit's second argument for a free speech violation - that the Solomon
Amendment forces schools to accommodate the military's message - the Supreme Court noted
that, unlike cases in which free speech violations were found after someone was forced to
accommodate another's message, 48 the law schools' own message was not affected by their
accommodation of military recruiters. 49 One case cited by the Court, Hurley v. Irish-American
Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc.,50 involving a state law that required a parade
411d. at 60.
42 1d. at 61.
4' 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
44 See id.
4' 430 U.S. 705 (1977).46 Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 61.47 1d. at 48.
48 See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 566 (1995) (holding that
a parade organizer does not have to include in a parade a group whose message the parade's organizer disagrees
with); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1986) (plurality opinion) (holding
that a utility company cannot be compelled by a state agency to put a newsletter from a third party in its billing
envelope); Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (holding that a right-of-reply statute is
unlawful because it interferes with newspaper editors' right to decide what goes in their publication).49 Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 64.
50 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
to include a group with whose message the parade organizer did not wish to be associated,51
illustrates the Court's reasoning well: parades, unlike recruiters on law school campuses, are "a
form of expression, not just motion." 52 The Court, then, did not think that mere acquiescence to
the presence of military recruiters on law school campuses implicated any discernible message
on the part of the law schools. Justice Roberts, on those grounds, struck down the FAIR schools'
argument that by treating military and non-military recruiters the same way, they could be
perceived as accepting the military's policies on homosexuals. 53 Again, Roberts stressed that
law schools could still say whatever they want about the military's policies on homosexuals.
54
4. The Conduct Compelled by the Solomon Amendment Was Not Sufficiently
Expressive to Warrant First Amendment Protection
The question addressed in this section of the opinion was essentially whether the conduct
(as opposed to the speech) compelled by adherence to the Solomon Amendment was the type of
expressive conduct that merited First Amendment protection.55 Two cases cited by the Court
illustrate the distinction it made before answering that question in the negative: in the O'Brien
case, draft card burning was not given First Amendment protection, in part because of the
legitimate government interest at stake.56 In Texas v. Johnson, however, flag burning was
deemed sufficiently expressive conduct to be protected by the First Amendment.57 In Rumsfeld,
the Court took a narrow view of what constitutes inherently expressive conduct akin to that seen
in Texas v. Johnson. According to the Court's analysis, the law schools' actions at issue here
lack an inherently expressive quality because it is only the speech that accompanies the conduct
51 id
52 Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 63 (quoting Hurley, 515 U.S. at 568).
531 d. at 64-65.
54 1d at 65.
55 id.
56 391 U.S. at 376 (1968).
57 491 U.S. at 406 (1989).
that makes it expressive.58 To find otherwise, the Court said, would allow people to "always
transform conduct into 'speech' simply by talking about it."
59
Additionally, the Court noted that with the present facts, as in O'Brien, the limitation on
free speech was permissible because of the presence of a substantial government interest "that
would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation." 60 The Court said the substantial
government interest served by the U.S. military recruiters' presence at law schools is "raising
and supporting the Armed Forces - an objective that would be achieved less effectively if the
military were forced to recruit on less favorable terms than other employers." 61 Without the
Solomon Amendment, non-military recruiters would be given an unfair advantage over military
recruiters.
62
5. The Solomon Amendment Did Not Violate the First Amendment Freedom
of Association
Having decided that the Solomon Amendment did not violate law schools' freedom of
speech, the Court then turned to the question of whether their First Amendment right to freely
associate was violated.63 The FAIR schools had argued that the statute's requirements that
military recruiters be allowed on their campuses, and law schools' assistance of those recruiters,
restricted their right to disassociate themselves from a group with whose policies they
disagreed.64 In support of its conclusion that the right of what the Supreme Court has called
"expressive association" 65 was not infringed upon, the Court distinguished the case of Boy Scouts
58 Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 66.
59 id.
60 Id. at 67 (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)).
6 1 
id.
62 See id. at 70.
6 3 1d. at68.
64 id.
65 Id. (citing Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000)).
ofAmerica v. Dale.6 6 In that case, the Supreme Court held that a state law requiring the Boy
Scouts to accept a homosexual as a scoutmaster violated the organization's First Amendment
freedom of association because forcing the Boy Scouts to accept the homosexual scoutmaster
would affect the organization's expression, and "the State's interests did not justify this
intrusion." 67 FAIR's situation was different from the Boy Scouts', the Court reasoned, because
although the law faculty are forced to interact with the military recruiters, the recruiters are not
part of the school. 68 The Court stated, "[r]ecruiters are, by definition, outsiders who come onto
campus for the limited purpose of trying to hire students - not to become members of the
school's expressive association. This distinction is critical.,
69
The Supreme Court then addressed FAIR's point that group membership decisions are
not the only kinds of decisions protected by the right to freely associate.70 However, the Court
said that did not apply to the facts at hand because, unlike cases illustrating that point, the law in
question - the Solomon Amendment - did not make a group's membership "less attractive," and
thus did not have the requisite deleterious effect on the group's "ability to express [its] message"
to invoke First Amendment protection.7'
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the Third Circuit's ruling. 72 Justice Alito did
not participate in the decision.73
IV. Conclusion
It is not surprising that the Supreme Court did not address the military's "don't ask, don't
tell" policy directly, although the controversial issue was arguably what attracted the attention of
66 Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 655-59.67 Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 68.68 Id. at 69.
69 id.
70 id.
71 Id. at 68-69.
72 Id. at 70.
73 id.
the media.74 But Rumsfeld v. FAIR is still important because of the way it delineates between
what constitutes protected First Amendment speech or conduct and what does not. The case
illustrates a sort of spectrum, with protected speech on one side and unprotected speech on the
other. A look at the decisions that inform this case shows that it is not necessarily the speech
itself that tips the scale one way or the other, but often whether there is a legitimate government
interest involved. 75 Burning a draft card 76 and burning a flag77 are both expressive acts, for
example, but the former serves a special purpose that is frustrated by its destruction, whereas
setting a flag on fire obstructs no such chain of bureaucratic events. Thus, where at first glance
Rumsfeld v. FAIR might seem to limit First Amendment protections, it might better be said that
the decision underscores the Supreme Court's continued emphasis on the presence of a
substantial government interest as part of its free speech analysis after O 'Brien.
The Court was right not to label law schools' conduct as expressive, after ruling that it
was not speech either.78 The fact that faculty members might e-mail students to alert them to
military recruiters' presence on campus or send out brochures and other information about
military employers is incidental to the Solomon Amendment's basic requirement that the
recruiters must simply be allowed on campus. 79 Indeed, to hold otherwise would be to create a
slippery slope, as Justice Roberts suggests, where a multitude of actions would fall under the
First Amendment's protective umbrella simply because they are accompanied by words or
speech. 80 There is no discernible message to speak of here. For a school to invite one particular
law firm or a U.S. Army recruiter over another employer expresses nothing aside from the fact
74 See, e.g., Darren Everson, Solomon's Wisdom, SLATE, Mar. 7, 2006, available at
http://www.slate.com/id/2137701/.
75 See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
76 See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 370.
77 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989).78 Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 66.
79 Id. at 61-62.80 Id. at 66-67.
that the school saw it fit to make that employer available to its students. Schools are, as Roberts
stressed, 81 free to voice their objection to the employers' policies.
Further, the law schools' nondiscrimination policies remain intact. It is, after all, up to
the students to decide with whose message they agree or disagree, and to take interviews and
accept job offers accordingly. Repugnant as the military's treatment of openly gay Americans
may be to some, it is not the duty of law schools to filter on-campus recruiters based on how
those recruiters' policies or employment practices square with those of the law schools that host
them.
One legal scholar, however, has suggested that the Court's emphasis on law schools'
freedom to voice their objection to the "don't ask, don't tell" policy marks a departure from
previous decisions.82 "Never before has the Supreme Court held that the government can compel
speech as long as the speaker can disavow the compelled message later," Erwin Chemerinsky
states. 83 But Chemerinsky also allows for the possibility that Rumsfeld v. FAIR was a narrow
ruling despite this possibly new analysis on compelled speech, in light of the Court's historic
deference towards the government in times of war and the fact that the decision was handed
down by "a Court that often has not been sensitive to discrimination against gays and lesbians."
84
The impact of this case is also unclear because it may only limit First Amendment
protections involving similar fact patterns: institutions of higher learning compelled by
conditional legislation to accommodate the presence of a group at whose policies the institution
bristles. However, since the Court did not expressly limit its holding to the facts presented, it
81 Id at65.
82 See Erwin Chemerinsky, The First Amendment and Military Recruiting, 42 TRIAL 78, 79 (2006).
83 Id at79.
84 id.
may leave the door open for the decision to have a wider impact on First Amendment
jurisprudence.
